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The prevalence of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in today’s society has given rise to an inherent asymmetry of control
between the watchers and the watched. A sense of unease relating to the unobservable observer (operator) often leads to a lack
of trust in the camera and its purpose, despite security cameras generally being present as a protective device. In this paper,
we detail our concept of Open Circuit Television and prototype CryptoCam, a novel system for secure sharing of video footage
to individuals and potential subjects nearby. Utilizing point-of-capture encryption and wireless transfer of time-based access
keys for footage, we have developed a system to encourage a more open approach to information sharing and consumption.
Detailing concerns highlighted in existing literature we formalize our over-arching concept into a framework called Open
Circuit Television (OCTV). Through CryptoCam we hope to address this asymmetry of control by providing subjects with
data equity, discoverability and oversight.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Video cameras are versatile tools, used for a plethora of purposes, from capturing one’s day to day life (lifelogging),
as an assistive technology [Hodges et al. 2006; Marcu et al. 2012], a means for sousveillance [Mann et al. 2002], as
a tool for documenting human rights abuses [Gregory 2010], as a scientific tool [Zhang et al. 2007], as a form of
sensing (e.g. Kinect1), for recording current affairs (for journalism), or as a tool for enhancing security in public
1Kinect, https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/kinect
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spaces. Yet, many existing surveillance systems are closed in nature: control often resides with the organization
which has recorded the footage, or to put it another way, with the watcher rather than the watched. For the
ordinary citizen, the process for obtaining footage can be challenging. One would have to notice the camera
(many are obscured), determine who owns it and in turn, make a formal request through legalistic processes. The
result might be that someone is provided with the footage several months later on a DVD (in a format and timing
that might well be of little use).
The closed nature of surveillance cameras, along with other privacy challenges, such as that video footage
can sometimes contain (directly or indirectly) sensitive personal data, and the desire for individual privacy more
generally, leads to concern over their configuration. There is a pressing need for cameras, but also a similar need
to configure these systems in a way that does not overly intrude into the rights of those being recorded. The
Ubicomp community has adopted a variety of approaches aimed at achieving this, including careful positioning of
cameras to ensure that their field of view is only focused on the target of interest [Thomaz et al. 2013]. However,
discoverability is an under explored area for CCTV, in terms of presence, purpose and configuration.
CryptoCam looks to enable new possibilities for configuration by deploying industry standard encryption
technologies to encrypt footage at point of capture with keys to the footage distributed to relevant parties.
The emphasis of CryptoCam is in redressing the asymmetry of control and access over footage from cameras.
Through moving the locus of control from operators to potential subjects, either in its entirety with a complete
local encryption solution with keys only held by subjects, or a more balanced solution with master keys held by
the camera operator. A client application on subjects’ mobile phone records keys from cameras nearby using
Bluetooth, placement and other configuration information can be shared at this time. The process is entirely
anonymous with no identification of the subjects needed or warranted. This particular configuration has several
advantages: in many settings (within the EU), it would fall within the domestic use exemption of the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)2 it is likely to enhance user trust (especially in the context of negative perceptions
of cameras). We hope its use will be accepted in a broader range of scenarios, while also enhancing consent and
accessibility in relation to the footage.
This paper presents a novel concept, CryptoCam, which will be made available as an open source tool that
others can build upon and deploy in a wide range of settings. We develop the context in which CryptoCam sits
in Section 2, including the development and exploration of how this context intersects with a broad range of
use cases. We then move to describe our framework we call Open Circuit Television (OCTV) (Section 3), before
describing the implementation of CryptoCam itself (Section 5) and the particular advantages of how CryptoCam
has been configured (Section 7). This paper concludes (Section 8) with a discussion of CryptoCam, and how it fits
into a wider family of potential systems that distribute the control of the data that they record.
2 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
2.1 Existing CCTV usage
In recent years we have seen an increase in both the number and application areas of CCTV Cameras, including
product security surveillance, workplace safety, dash- and taxi-cams and police body cameras. There has been a
wealth of evidence to validate the installation of much of this infrastructure [Welsh and Farrington 2002, 2003].
However, the proliferation of CCTV in today’s society leads to renewed privacy concerns.
Closed Circuit Television is, by definition, closed to the public. CCTV subjects themselves are typically the ones
excluded, leading to apprehensions about being covertly, and perhaps maliciously surveiled. This self-defeating
prejudice about CCTV often prevents adoption of cameras for their original intended purpose as a deterrent and
protective device. The ‘Big-Brother’ attitude of governments and organizations in utilizing CCTV for other means,
including enforcement and performance monitoring, has again reduced CCTV to more of a nuisance to subjects
2General Data Protection Regulation, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32016R0679
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 9, No. 4, Article 39. Publication date:
November 2017.
CryptoCam: Privacy Conscious Open Circuit Television • 39:3
rather than an asset. Subjects can be frustrated further by the often complex and arduous processes to retrieve
footage of themselves. Research into breaking down some of these barriers to access and discoverability can open
up potential application scenarios for CCTV and other video recording technologies. Moncrieff and Mollers argue
that dynamism in privacy controls is the answer to preserving privacy of subjects while maintaining the purpose
of the cameras and that designers should build systems which integrate privacy controls [Möllers and Hälterlein
2013; Moncrieff et al. 2009]. “Privacy as an optimization problem” storing the minimum amount of information
about subjects as possible, “data hiding” with sensitive parts of footage obscured or removed, “context-aware
surveillance” with a dynamic privacy policy based on the current state of the camera or subjects and finally “data
equity” with footage more open to relevant individuals.
Existing work on dynamism in camera technology has focused on “data hiding” and “optimizing” using
Computer Vision techniques to hide irrelevant or sensitive parts of an image [Boult 2005; Chattopadhyay and
Boult 2007; Senior et al. 2003, 2005]. These approaches to enhancing privacy provide a flexible and convenient
means to protect subjects, however, the vision based techniques are limited by what they can accurately detect and
‘understand’. Privacy Cam [Chattopadhyay and Boult 2007], could detect individuals and encrypt their portion of
the image with a unique key for later decryption by the subject. However, beyond distinguishing between people,
user identification of an individual person was not performed, nor was distribution of users’ key.
Goold et al. discusses the “unobservable observer” [Goold 2002], emphasizing one of the key concerns of
individuals concerning CCTV [Nguyen et al. 2011; Smith et al. 1996]. The remote observer of footage is largely
unknown. It is unclear the status of any particular camera: for example, who has access to the camera feed?
Is it continuously monitored? Recorded? How long is it stored for? Abuse in CCTV operations is also a cause
for concern with regards to privacy [Taylor and Gill 2014]. The asymmetry of power and control creates a
potential for abuse. Increasingly, private firms are “donating” their footage to state services, with camera operator,
commercial organized and trained [Walby 2005]. Oversight in the small application of CCTV is problematic. The
increasing usage of CCTV is in the trust of security cameras as such cameras are deployed in more sensitive areas
(e.g. schools [Taylor 2012; Yorke 2010]). How can regulation and technical solutions keep pace to protect privacy?
Freedom of Information requests and other relevant legislation governing sharing of footage and signage for
CCTV have failed to keep pace with advancing technology. Current processes are evidenced as being inadequate
[Spiller 2015], obtaining existing footage can be challenging. One would have to notice the camera (many are
obscured), then determine who owns it before, in turn, making a formal request through legalistic processes. The
result might be that someone is provided with the footage several months later on a DVD. This process if often
inadequate and inefficient. Technical approaches to support discovery in terms of presence, access to data and
configuration would potentially lead to a greater level of trust in CCTV and better practices for the use of CCTV.
2.2 Configuration for Privacy
Privacy is an inherently subjective term, indeed Westin states “no definition of privacy is possible” [Westin 1966].
Governments and corporations often offer assurances of their attitude towards preserving this fundamental con-
cept in modern society. Arguably, any such privacy measure in a system is only as secure as the trustworthiness of
the engineers involved in its construction. Industry has, in response, attempted to move control and responsibility
for the protection of our personal data to the user. This reduces (but does not eliminate) the trust requirement
for engineers. WhatsApp3, iMessage4, iCloud5 and Keybase6 have all migrated their encryption key handling to
the end user. The user login is used to decrypt the keys for each service. Mozilla Firefox have a comprehensive
3WhatsApp, https://www.whatsapp.com
4Apple iMessage, https://support.apple.com/en-gb/explore/messages
5Apple iCloud, https://www.icloud.com
6Keybase, https://keybase.io
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example of this with their accounts data7. However, this is compromised by government interventions in existing
cryptographically secure implementation of services, requiring the inclusion of back doors into systems making
them fundamentally insecure [Griffin 2015].
Westin reasons that privacy is “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”. Therefore, placing the keys to our
data in the hands of the users, is a move towards the desirable goal of increased privacy. However, oversight
in such cases is still limited, with the type of data held and its usage still largely obscured. Companies like
Google have demonstrated a cavalier attitude to privacy, with rather objectionable abuse of their advertising
and search powers resulting in large fines from governments [Boffey 2017] and consumer law suits [Fadilpašić
2017]. Provision of services for free can often be accompanied by aggressive collection of user data to fund these
services. Moving control of the data to the users, provides and interesting paradigm shift in the approach to
management and control over data and its storage. BitTorrent protocol8 and IPFS9 are the most widely used
implementations to date of peer supported distribution and storage networks respectively. Indeed, Yeung et al.
argue for such an approach: for social networks with user data stored in a decentralized manner [Yeung et al.
2009]. The wealth of video and data recorded of individuals is vast and ever growing. Adequate access, oversight
and control procedures have failed to keep pace.
Commonly used technical means of limiting capture include reducing the resolution of the camera [Jackson
et al. 2009], changing the framerate (including to on the order of minutes [Hodges et al. 2006]), or changing
the frequency spectrum (e.g. room occupancy10). More technically advanced approaches involve processing the
content of the video, for instance by blurring facial features, or even by changing what is recorded based upon
who is in the picture [Chattopadhyay and Boult 2007; Zhang et al. 2016]. There are also pragmatic approaches,
such as raising awareness through signage, and making the camera itself obvious.
More generally in image capture, careful configuration has been used to allow cameras to be used as a sensor
while maintaining privacy. Approaches include positioning, which is often confined with a constrained field of
view in order to ensure that the system is only focused on the location or object of interest [Thomaz et al. 2013].
Channeling light using optical fibres in tabletop surfaces to perform input [Jackson et al. 2009] or fingerprint
recognition for user authentication [Holz and Baudisch 2013], while not being able to image things above the
surface. Similarly, Iris [Montague et al. 2017] achieved this while performing more general object recognition by
using an optical diffuser.
2.3 Summary
Our work is focused on deploying technology to provoke change in the handling of data collected about the
public. We focus our work on video cameras, particularly CCTV. In our work we hope to introduce the concept of
Open Circuit Television, with a new approach to discovery, ownership and control over cameras. In doing so we
hope to address the asymmetry of control, access and privacy of subjects of CCTV, a currently under-explored
area of Ubicomp.
3 BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR OPEN CIRCUIT TELEVISION
In order to understand the possibilities for a more open approach to camera infrastructure we constructed a
framework for Open Circuit Television. We developed this framework to guide our research and design with a
7Firefox Accounts, https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/
8BitTorrent, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent
9IPFS, https://ipfs.io
10Density, https://www.density.io
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view to constructing a system that covered the wealth of issues relating to CCTV cameras and the consequences
of change in certain aspects of surveillance infrastructure introduced by OCTV.
We consider OCTV as an opportunity to redefine existing constraints of camera configuration through
applying novel technological solutions. We highlight five key areas in our framework: space & configuration,
discoverability, access and restrictions, and symmetry in control. This framework aims to guide development of
OCTV technological solutions to address the issues we discuss in this work. We also hope to use this framework
to highlight areas which users may need to be aware of when considering how to respond to the presence of
a camera. The overall focus of this framework is based on the equitable sharing of footage and a more open
approach to cameras [Brush et al. 2013].
3.1 Configuration & Space
The configuration and space in which a camera operates can influence many features of a camera and its
corresponding placement. Considering these new parameters for configuration allows us to build upon these in
the subsequent components of OCTV. Oversight of these parameters could help to balance the asymmetry in
the accessing of data and placement of cameras, and hopefully reduce abusive practices through making this
configuration more public. Issues arise around the appropriateness of cameras in certain settings and how such
cameras can be adapted to better suit the space and its occupants.
3.1.1 Public / Private. Public and private camera settings have different priorities in their considerations.
Public spaces are often larger areas and can be more liberal with their data access policies. Subjects within a
public space would perhaps be more open as their conduct is already expected to be public. Accidentally granting
access to those outside of the view of a camera, yet still near, is perhaps less problematic. Conversely private
spaces require more careful consideration of sharing and storage policies as the potential for a breach of privacy
is increased.
3.1.2 Fixed / Mobile. The positioning and placement of a camera also impacts upon the usage and suitability
of deployment. Fixed and mobile cameras have different design considerations. Fixed cameras, for instance, have
a more predictable content, the overall area in view is fixed, and is often accompanied with appropriate signage
and expectations. Fixed cameras are therefore more appropriate in surveillance and security contexts. Conversely,
mobile cameras can provide much more raw and unfiltered footage and the scene is unpredictable. A body-cam, or
other mobile camera, may capture unintended and personal information. Subjects can typically make reasonable
adjustments before being filmed by a fixed camera, but this is often not so easily the case with mobile cameras.
Typically, suitable signage is impractical and the storage and sharing of footage is more difficult to control.
3.1.3 Lifecycle and Storage. Visibility of the lifecycle and storage of footage is paramount to trust in a system.
How long a camera recording is retained, even if that period is indefinite (no longer permitted in the EU under
GDPR), is information that users could be made aware of. The process for destruction, and the circumstances
in which footage may be used, and methods by which privacy will be preserved, should all be considered here.
Furthermore, the manner in which footage is stored is important: whether encryption technologies are used,
and any key storage and sharing solutions. Not only would potential subjects be able to understand how their
personal information is stored, but again, to provide external stimulus to best practices.
3.2 Discoverability
The ability of users to discover the presence and configuration of cameras in a space is a vital aspect of the
oversight and trust-building we look to encourage with Open Circuit Television. Simple, reliable and accurate
means of discovery of a camera would be the objective, as it is important that subjects can reflect upon a situation
being recorded, and this encourages best practices for operators.
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3.2.1 Responsibility. Establishing who is responsible for a particular camera is a prevalent issue within existing
camera installations. Private and public cameras’ existing access procedures are often unclear and can lack signage
or clarity around camera and data owner responsibility (despite the requirement of providing this information
publicly in many jurisdictions). Clear advertising of this information can potentially speed up such access and
reduce administrative work involved in these procedures.
3.2.2 Location. The exact location of a camera within a space is again an important consideration in dis-
coverability. Knowing that there is a camera nearby, but not exactly where it is placed, can prevent subjects’
preparations towards privacy. Conversely, providing detailed placement information without breaching privacy
or security of individuals or buildings is a point of concern. A frame from the camera intended to establish
position could unduly leak personal information.
3.3 Access and Restrictions
Access to footage, with varying degrees of access offered, forms a key part of OCTV, restricting: the video feed,
audio channel and file access. One approach would be to base access level on a subject’s appropriateness: those
closer to the camera receiving higher-level access, while fringe subjects receive limited access. Footage availability
may be delayed for review, made available immediately or withheld by the operator. Restrictions on the usage of,
and retrieval of, footage (both for the operator and subject), soliciting permission/release for operators to use
footage, subjects re-publishing restrictions, and removal of identifiable information from footage, can all form
part of the camera configuration.
3.3.1 Recording State. Visibility over a camera’s specific state is an important consideration for OCTV: whether
the camera is recording, and whether it is being actively monitored or used for post-reflective surveillance. These
factors may depend on a schedule (i.e. only recording for certain times of the day, or only actively monitored at
certain times). While such information for many camera situations may be obvious, or otherwise not necessary
to disclose, there is potential for disclosing the details and type of surveillance being conducted. In particular,
active surveillance is something that again perhaps propagates negative perceptions about cameras, and better
visibility of this information could address this.
3.4 Symmetry in Control
The current asymmetry of control over footage is a balance that can be addressed in OCTV. Increasing oversight
of camera systems, and providing subjects with some aspects of control through novel mechanisms, moves
towards breaking down existing control paradigms and more open and democratic cameras.
4 SCENARIOS
To illustrate our motivations for Open Circuit Television we will explore each of these exemplar scenarios. We
uncover and identify issues surrounding the ownership and access rights of media, and the discoverability of
cameras and footage.
4.1 Workplace Cameras
Workplace cameras are commonplace, yet under existing legislation in many jurisdictions, private organizations
are under no obligation to share camera footage with their employees [Friedman et al. 2006; Massimi et al. 2010].
Instead, they are typically configured primarily for the needs of the owner. As such these cameras are often
perceived as being used for organizational surveillance and performance monitoring, making them undesirable
to the workforce they could also be protecting.
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4.2 Dash- and Taxi Cameras
Taxi cameras are present in many private taxi cabs today, despite the public being less accepting of their presence
[You Gov 2010], their existence has improved driver safety [Menéndez et al. 2013]. These protective devices
are an inexpensive way for drivers and, to some extent, passengers to record generally irrefutable evidence
of what occurred on a journey. However, the footage is controlled and owned by the driver or operator. In
many jurisdictions these individuals or organizations are not compelled by law to hand over footage in criminal
proceedings. As such, whilst arguably the camera is there for the protection of the driver and passengers; in
reality it is the driver that maintains control. In situations where the driver is at fault this ownership model
could prove unfair. Furthermore, the footage captured within a taxi can be sensitive in nature due to an assumed
privacy from the enclosed space.
4.3 Body Cameras
Police body cameras are a relatively recent means for police forces to provide adequate oversight over the actions
of their officers and provide evidence in criminal proceedings. The presence of these cameras is undoubtedly of
benefit to both officers and the general public [Tullio et al. 2010], camera footage is a powerful tool in many court
cases. Footage has been used as irrefutable evidence in trials [US Supreme Court [n. d.]], though its irrefutability
is obviously questioned [Wasserman [n. d.]], it is however a very powerful form of evidence [Gregory 2010;
McLagan 2006]. Recent cases in the US have further demonstrated the importance of body cameras for oversight
in police shooting cases, both to exonerate and incriminate officers. However, access to these recordings is
restricted, their release determined by police departments, sometimes understandably. In cases of police brutality,
there is often little justification for withholding recordings, yet it still happens. While there are already procedures
in place in most jurisdictions for subjects to access footage, these processes are often expensive (either to the
individual or the tax payer), time consuming and inaccessible to many due to the bureaucracy related to these
submissions.
4.4 Domestic / Home Security Cameras
Thus far, we have focused on institutional and commercial surveillance systems, however, there are a large
number of small private business and domestic cameras installed around the world. New smart cameras have
accelerated the numbers of domestic cameras, indeed such cameras are described as effective deterrents against
burglars [Smithers 2017]. Companies such as Nest11 provide features like person detection and event triggering
through services like IFTTT12. There is no register of owners in this category, so it is difficult to accurately assess
numbers here, however, there has been a significant increase in these cameras usage in criminal cases [Hill
2018]. The discoverability of these cameras is fast becoming a societal problem: with cameras being directed at
neighbors’ properties [Dominiczak 2013] and tenants/visitors having little awareness of cameras or control over
their own privacy.
4.5 Live Streaming Services
The raw, unfiltered nature of “live streaming” is one of the immediate attractions of these recent platforms.
Post-production editing has usually provided the opportunity to make such videos sensitive to other subjects’
privacy. Soliciting of consent to record is not legally required in many jurisdictions in public spaces. Soliciting
consent during a live stream is impractical in most cases and detracts from the medium’s raw nature. Technology
to detect and obscure sensitive parts of the footage may prove too aggressive, yet soliciting consent from those
nearby via technological means could improve privacy in live streaming.
11Nest, https://nest.com/
12IFTTT, https://ifttt.com
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Fig. 1. Footage is recorded, encrypted and uploaded to a cloud storage provider. Encryption keys are distributed to phone-
based listening clients nearby. Phone clients later retrieve encrypted footage from the cloud and decrypt the contents using
the key previously provided locally, then the footage can be played on the device.
5 CRYPTOCAM
CryptoCam is a prototype Open Circuit Television system, using state of the art encryption technologies and
Bluetooth to secure footage and share access tokens with subjects. Combining existing technologies to produce a
simple yet powerful system to realize the possibilities for Open Circuit Television.
CryptoCam is a camera that combines encryption and Bluetooth to create a secure and anonymous footage
sharing system. Video footage is taken from the camera and encrypted, the key used for encryption is randomly
selected at the beginning of the recording interval. This key is made available to users nearby over Bluetooth
(Fig. 2). Software clients installed on users’ devices listen for encryption keys broadcast from cameras nearby,
storing these keys for possible later use. The flow of data is described in Fig. 1. Cameras also describe a file
access protocol, these files can be later retrieved in an encrypted form from the specified location. If required, the
encryption keys collected locally are then used to decrypt the encrypted video footage once retrieved. Crucially,
all decryption occurs on the device, the key never leaves the device so the user is not identified to the server and
the encryption key stays private to the camera and nearby devices. Periodically, the current, encrypted, recording
is uploaded to the specified file store and erased locally, and a new encrypted recording is started using another,
randomly selected, key.
5.1 Camera Implementation
The prototype implementation uses a Raspberry Pi Zero W13 with a Pi Camera v2.1 module14. This hardware
provides an inexpensive, small and low power package which is highly configurable. The CryptoCam software
runs on Node.js15 and an industry-standard encryption stack (OpenSSL16) is used to handle encryption of footage
and generation of keys. The camera is configured to continuously record with a pre-configured segment interval.
13Raspberry Pi Zero W, https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/raspberry-pi-zero-w/
14Raspberry Pi Camera module V2, https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/camera-module-v2/
15Node.js, https://nodejs.org
16OpenSSL, https://www.openssl.org
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
AES-256 Key (32 bytes)
SN RI Video ID (8 bytes)
Previous File Hash (21 bytes)
Fig. 2. Key packet byte structure: AES-256 encryption key, SN - Packet sequence number, RI - Client reconnect interval,
Video ID for file retrieval, first 21 bytes of last recording SHA-256 file hash.
Fig. 3. CryptoCam Android application.
A random 256-bit key is generated and broadcast to any devices listening nearby, along with a video identifier. At
the segment interval boundary the recorded file is hashed (SHA-256), and part of the hash broadcast alongside
the next key exchange. This guards against subsequent changes to the recording file (however manipulation
could occur before the recording is complete).
The video file is encrypted with AES-256, a cryptographically secure encryption function and choice of key
length. This video is uploaded to be available at the URL broadcast to listening devices and deleted locally. All
video processing occurs in RAM to reduce the probability of file restoration or key recovery. The Bluetooth
packet structure is outlined in Fig. 2.
The Camera Info Service provides meta-information, version information, a ‘friendly’ name and location details.
The file location structure is also accessible here with the following structure:
<scheme>://<address-of-file-store>/<hex-encoding-of-video-id>.{mp4|jpg}
5.2 Listening Client Implementations
Listening clients run on a user’s smartphone as a passive application in the background, collecting keys from
nearby cameras. These keys are stored for later use within the application. Whenever the user wants to see when
they have been the subject of a recording, the discovered cameras and video segments are organized into groups
based on their proximity to one another. If the user requests to play a video from within the application, the
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Table 1. CryptoCam Descriptors
Characteristic Options UUID
Name 0001
Mode auto, manual, delayed 0002
Location coordinates, description 0003
URL Format 0004
Key 0011
All UUIDs are prefixed with the CryptoCam ID: cc92cc92-ca19-0000-0000-00000000####.
appropriate encrypted file is retrieved from the URL originally provided by the camera. This file is then decrypted
locally using the AES-256 key included in the original key packet, then played back. Implementations of the
client have been made available for iOS17 and Android18 though, due to background processing limitations on
iOS, the key listener is currently less reliable on this platform.
5.3 Finding Nearby Cameras
Using local broadcast technologies we pose that CryptoCam can provide a reliable communication, not only of its
presence in a area, but also further camera meta-data. CryptoCam advertises at regular intervals with Bluetooth
Low Energy broadcasts, and can be interrogated by clients for further details. To address the discoverability of
cameras users need to be able to reliably and easily discover when they were/are being recorded. Each potential
subject of a camera in the immediate vicinity of a camera should be notified of its presence and perhaps, depending
on the application scenario, its purpose. Other meta-information about the camera, how the data is handled,
length of storage, audio recording, etc. are all important considerations for users near a particular camera. Using
Bluetooth characteristics for static configuration variables, the camera configuration can be provided to users
(outlined in Table 1).
5.4 Simple File Access
A right of access to footage is a crucial principle of CryptoCam. Simple, reliable exercising of this right with
CryptoCam is achieved through being in the vicinity (Bluetooth range) of a camera and retrieving encryption keys.
This provides a user’s right to access, with the scope of their access pre-determined by the camera configuration.
Using the encryption keys obtained from the camera at the point of capture, users can pull the relevant recording
and decrypt its contents for local playback. This process provides a balance between secure and verifiable
access, and simple and readily available access. Crucially, this process is automated, requiring minimal direct
administration.
5.5 Non-Exclusive Design
The features of CryptoCam outlined in this paper aim to address some of social and procedural issues around
CCTV and private camera operation. However, many of these features could arguably be considered to provide
unacceptable restrictions for a camera operator. The features of CryptoCam have been designed to be non-
exclusive, in that the level of implementation of each feature can be interrogated by client devices and differ
based on operator preference.
17Apple iOS, https://www.apple.com/uk/ios/ios-11/
18Google Android, https://www.android.com
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6 STUDY
To evaluate the concept of CryptoCam we constructed a user study to asses this challenge to existing CCTV
infrastructure and perceptions. We chose a study that would not only highlight our approach to information
sharing but also build a meaningful application of this footage for users. An obvious challenge to running a
study with a technology such as this is that many of the scenarios and use cases we have discussed so far rely
on ubiquity of CryptoCam cameras. As this was an insurmountable problem for our user study we decided to
choose a constrained environment, the workplace. We deployed xx cameras around Newcastle University’s Urban
Science Building covering a range of spaces. Meeting rooms, desk spaces, kitchens and other general break out
spaces were all covered. The CryptoCams deployed were all no audio cameras following the automatic upload
and share procedure outline above. Cameras were set up as wide angles to avoid capturing detail and provide
more of a contextual shot, reducing potential privacy issues with key bleed.
In order to provide a more compelling experience to our participants and demonstrate the possibilities for
more open camera sharing policies we were also to construct films of participants day. As part of the study we
requested access to meta-data about our participants. Namely their heart rate data (a fitness tracker was provided
if they did not already have one), general fitness data and calendar. As we were deployed in a workspace we
hoped to combine these data sets to produce compelling films of their day, integrating meta-data into the films to
enable users to reflect. Essentially we wished to use the meta-data to index the footage, providing insight into
this potential information overload. The study was run over the course of a week (5 working days).
We recruited 10 participants (avg.) to install the CryptoCam application on their Android phones (iOS system
limitations restrict CC usage). The application provides basic viewing capabilities, collecting keys from cameras
the users pass throughout the day. The participants were encouraged interact with the application regularly and
reflect on the privacy implications of such a system contrasted with the freedom of access. We used a slightly
modified client application to log the keys for footage to enable the next step of the study. At the end of the week
we retrieved the logged keys from each of our participants phones along with their activity and calendar data
for that week. We constructed short films of their day referencing significant portions of their day denoted by
their activity or calendar data or a combination of both. Used to index against the CryptoCam footage keys we
constructed a custom film of their week highlighting segments of CryptoCam film where their heart rate was
elevated, they were exercising or they had a meeting near a camera.
Each participant was then presented with their film in an interview session. Each film was an average of
xx mins long. After the participants had watched their film we conducted interviews with each participant.
In the interviews we sought to discover what our participants perceptions of existing CCTV technology was,
including their perceptions or perhaps experience of access procedures related to these cameras. We then sought
reflections on CryptoCam’s more open data sharing policies, whether technologies such as this could change
their perceptions around CCTV, if this would make them more comfortable with cameras being a more ubiquitous
environmental sensor in workplaces, homes and other public places. Finally we asked participants to reflect on
the films we had created for them, if such an application of ubiquitous cameras also influenced their perceptions
around CCTV, moving it beyond simply a security/protective device towards a more personal reflective device
perhaps.
Participant interviews were semi-structured, with thematic ana
6.1 Results
7 DISCUSSION
CryptoCam provides the opportunity to democratize access to footage. Simple, passive and secure sharing of
footage from any camera while potentially addressing pre-existing privacy issues relating to camera access also
opens up new issues of privacy. The concept of trust with CryptoCam is one of the system’s most important
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Fig. 4. Diagram showing Bluetooth range exceeding the confines of the intended recipients, the occupants of the room being
observed by the camera.
concerns. The details of the key sharing, footage data storage and access, and the provenance of the data, are all
intrinsically linked to the privacy features of the camera.
7.1 Bounded Key Transfer
Wireless transmissions cannot guarantee that coverage is exclusively bounded to a certain area. Key ‘leakage’
occurs where footage access tokens are provided to those who are not subjects of the recordings and are outside
the locus of the surveillance area. See the example shown in Fig. 4, some recipients are not in the subject room.
Techniques that may address this problem are outlined in this section.
7.1.1 Explicit Verification Processes. Proof of presence could be made more explicit. For example, by entering a
randomly generated code shown on the camera at regular intervals, or presenting to the camera a QR code on the
screen of a subject’s smartphone, would provide the verification required to ensure that only subjects within the
view of the camera can access footage. However, this technique is far more intrusive and inconvenient to users.
7.1.2 Vision Analysis. The possible key leakage issues we envisage could may be solved by matching an
individual in the footage using Computer Vision techniques. A reliable means of identification of which key
listening device corresponds to which individual subject within the frame, would ensure that only those who
should get access to footage are given access. Several techniques have been explored in existing literature for
identification of people from video, including: association of accelerometer data from phones with detected
walking gate [Nikou 2016], identifying users with a view to obscure them from images [Zhang et al. 2016] and
other facial tracking work [McKenna 2016]. These techniques demonstrate the possibilities for identification of
users however, they require some corresponding information from subjects. This information is in some cases
personal or requires sacrificing other non-identifiable information [Zhang et al. 2016]. CryptoCam as a concept
was developed to preserve the privacy of the subject, it does not require any user login or other identifying
process, introduction of any such features should be carefully balanced with any related privacy sacrifices.
7.1.3 Audio Chirps. Audio ‘chirps’ are a well used method of providing a unique and discrete means of
passing digital data between devices through audio channels. The benefit of this method of communication
for applications such as CryptoCam is that audio chirps are more localized and that a chirp is less likely to go
beyond the bounds of a room, for instance. However, access to the background audio processing required to
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achieve this is often blocked on mobile devices. Furthermore, the range of audio chirps sent or received from a
smartphone may be broader or narrower than the intended range, as such this technique of verification should
be used in conjunction with others. Amongst other techniques, Google’s Nearby API19 deploys audio chirps, and
demonstrates the technical feasibility of this approach to proximity verification.
7.2 Access Granularity
7.2.1 Levels of Access. Footage from CryptoCam could have levels of access described to preserve the privacy
of potential subjects. Altering the resolution, regions of footage or audio according to some calculated level of
trust for a key listening client could address some of the concerns around privacy in access. Used in conjunction
with other techniques outlined above, a user could have a base access level with a low resolution version of the
footage. When a particular user is validated as being within the scene (for instance, from vision analysis) they
could be provided with keys to the high resolution version. When a phone is close enough to be identified (for
instance, with an audio chirp from the phone or camera) then the audio track could be provided to the user. This
technique of discrete levels of access to footage could limit the potential impact of errors in determining subjects,
whilst still providing simple and unobtrusive access.
7.2.2 Advertise Tokens for Fine-Grained Recording Intervals. To reduce wireless network contention, and
better manage limited resources, CryptoCam allows for pre-configuration of the recording interval to provide
appropriate time intervals for client connection based upon expected size of audience. A large set of subjects
needing to connect and read keys from a camera requires a longer interval to ensure keys are not missed (due to
saturation of the channel). However, a longer interval leads to more information bleed: i.e. if a subject is only
present for a fraction of an interval they receive footage for the entire interval. Using Bluetooth advertising
packets, which are broadcast, we can potentially address this issue. By advertising tokens at a much shorter
interval, although these tokens alone cannot be used to decrypt footage, a final key can be retrieved from the
camera which decrypts the file into a selection on smaller chunks to be decrypted with the available tokens. Such
an implementation provides potential for much smaller segment lengths with a lower risk of information bleed.
7.3 Distributed File Access
Footage ownership remains a significant issue in any democratized video access protocol. Sharing content from
cameras relies on the camera operator making this footage available to others. We propose that subjects have
a right of ownership to recorded footage from cameras, de-centralizing the storage and ownership model of
cameras potentially has benefits for both camera operators and subjects, breaking down the current asymmetric
ownership model of CCTV and private cameras. Deploying technologies such as IPFS, built upon the principles
of peer-to-peer file sharing, content can be distributed to many devices for later reconstruction. Operators can
potentially save storage space by distributing their recording amongst subjects with a means to access these files
at a later date if necessary. Subjects can have direct ownership over the recordings with these files stored on their
devices or have access, equal to that of the operators, to a shared recording.
7.4 Hardware/Software Verification
To ensure footage is handled as outlined in this paper we propose a verification process for both software and
hardware solutions. Laptops and smartphones are typically privacy protected through hardware (e.g. camera
light illuminated when active) and software (e.g. explicit access prompts) means. Similarly, we need a means
to verify that the CryptoCam camera feed is being handled in the way it is intended. Footage from the camera
should be encrypted at point of capture and stored in memory to reduce the likelihood of physical access recovery
19Google Nearby API, https://developers.google.com/nearby/
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 9, No. 4, Article 39. Publication date:
November 2017.
39:14 • Wilkinson, G. et al.
of unencrypted footage. Trust in third-party developed cameras could be improved by using hardware camera
modules which encapsulate this process, including the broadcast of keys. Authentication chips similar to those
present in Apple’s MFi20 program products and Trusted Platform Modules21 could ensure that the camera has not
been tampered with. Software solutions may also be required (e.g. a smartphone application), these solutions could
also be verified to ensure compliance with the CryptoCam standard. Such practices are widespread in various
industry technologies, CryptoCam particularly mandates such a process to ensure trust in the system. The level
of CryptoCam implementation can also be encoded into this verified camera process, CryptoCam’s non-exclusive
implementation allows for features to be implemented to varying degrees of completeness. Providing a clear
representation of which components are private and which have been altered is crucial to build trust in the
system.
7.5 Data Protection Regulation
Data protections issues, in particular the European General Data Protection Regulation, is a topic of great concern
to industry at the moment. GDPR and CryptoCam come from similar motivations and backgrounds. Moving the
locus of control over data from corporations towards the subjects whom the data is about. We argue that many
of the subsequent realities of a deployment of CryptoCam satisfy legislation and CryptoCam has the potential to
be a powerful tool for both subjects and operators, with compliance with GDPR one of many benefits alongside
the potential for distributed storage and streamlined handling of access requests to footage. With data access
being a key part of GDPR, a means to expedite these processes would be a boon to camera operators.
7.6 A New Dawn for CCTV
CryptoCam is an incredibly flexible concept, building out from the Open Circuit Television framework introduced
above, we address many of the issues highlighted. The flexibility of the concept allows for deployment in
appropriate situations with appropriate configuration. We posit that technology solutions such as these provide
a new means for configuration for privacy and access for organizations. Applying the principles of the OCTV
framework in conjunction with novel technology concepts such as CryptoCam we hope to provide a system of
security and surveillance cameras which is more open and subject to scrutiny. Redressing the balance of power
over footage with concepts such as CryptoCam we hope to change perceptions about surveillance cameras in our
lives, restoring them as protective devices.
7.7 CryptoX
CryptoCam has been discussed as a video camera, however the concept is not intrinsically linked to video alone.
As such we also propose an expansion of this concept, something we call CryptoX. Sensor data, presence proof,
audio and photos can also be used with CryptoX. For example, sensor data and audio collection of this information
by a local government or private organization. As a subject of this data you, perhaps, should reasonably have
access to this data. Also, discovering what is being collected and why, with a system to discover the sensor
equipment deployed nearby. CryptoX can also be used for proof of presence, large parts of our legal processes are
still archaic in that they rely on a completely un-verifiable signature. Making digital signing a more convenient
and provable process with proof of presence mechanisms supported by CryptoX could revolutionize many aspects
of legal processes.
20Apple MFi Program, https://developer.apple.com/programs/mfi/
21Trusted PlatformModule, https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/hardware-protection/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview
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8 CONCLUSION
The concept Open Circuit Television (OCTV) has potential to be an important step in respect of ubiquitous
camera systems, offering a novel route towards configuring a camera system that is more concomitant with
the needs of those who are likely to be recorded. We believe this will enhance public trust in public camera
settings, enable or smooth their deployment in sensitive settings (especially in the context of data protection
legislation), and democratize the process of accessing camera footage, shifting the emphasis from the watcher to
the watched. Through CryptoCam itself, we have provided a pragmatic implementation of OCTV, which we are
making available to the community to adapt for camera systems.22
The initial motivation and overall developed goal of this project was to increase trust in CCTV. We deploy
the term Open Circuit Television as a provocative challenge to open access to these typically closed (or rather,
obscure) systems. We hope to rebuild trust in cameras as a protective device through proposing a system that
prohibits typical abuses of existing cameras whilst also presenting novel and interesting new discovery and
playback experiences for users, and as a potentially powerful tool in our everyday lives. Google Clips23 and other
life-logging cameras24 demonstrate an industry and consumer interest in collecting more media in our lives,
however, this needs to be weighed against privacy issues that may arise from this additional capture.
We consider that this framework will be of wide utility: there are all manner of scenarios beyond fixed cameras
where CryptoCam (or an implementation thereof) would be beneficial. Whilst our framework, as articulated
in this paper, is focused upon fixed cameras (for ease of description), we note that CryptoCam could be easily
used in a mobile setting, where wearable or smartphone mounted camera footage is made available to people
who were within their vicinity. This would range from the social (e.g. gathering footage in a manner akin to
Bootlegger [Schofield et al. 2015] at a public event or concert: the difference would be that anyone could control
the footage), onto police body-cams and individuals engaged in the practice of sousveillance [Mann et al. 2002].
Similarly, the broader framework need not be constrained to the transmission of video: other data could also be
transmitted and distributed using the CryptoCam mechanism, including sensor data, photos, audio, documents,
and for any scenario that would benefit from location-orientated access control. Although this is a matter for
future work, all of these settings represent a fruitful opportunity to explore the usage of CryptoCam, either as a
discrete system or a component of another camera implementation, fitting with the existing agenda surrounding
cameras and Ubicomp.
We hope that a renewed focus on openness in public cameras will lead to a more trusted and socially acceptable
set of security cameras. Bringing cameras back to their original purpose as a deterrent and protective device for
the public, rather than a measure for ‘Big Brother’.
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